A SECOND

LETTER

TO A

MEMBER

OF

PARLIAMENT

Concerning the Preſent State of AFFAIRS.

Wherein all that has been written againſt the former is fully refuted; and the Poſitions therein laid down with reſpect to the Right of Inſtructing Members, &c. are farther explained and ſupported from Reaſon, Law, and Hiſtory.

Inertis eſt neſcire quod ſibi liceat.

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A SECOND LETTER TO A MEMBER of PARLIAMENT, &c.

SIR,

THE Epiſtle I lately wrote you hath drawn upon me ſuch a Torrent of Scurrility, that I find it not expedient only, but neceſſary, to trouble you once again. My former came unexpected, whereas this, I dare ſay, will be expected ſome Time before it comes. You are too jealous of your own Reputation, to believe that any Man, endued with a Portion of common Senſe, could ſit down tamely under

under ſuch Treatment; alike inexcuſable and undeſerved. The Man who ſcatters Abuſe may well enough ſuſtain it, but for a Writer who avoided, with ſo much Care as I did, all Reflexions that could be deemed Perſonal, to be painted out as a Diſtributer of Poiſon *, as a profeſſed Sycophant †, and a mercenary Libeller ‡, muſt give him Pain, though publiſhed in Papers wrote for Bread.

That theſe People have altogether miſtaken my Deſign, yourſelf, and every impartial Reader, muſt allow. They do me the Honour to aſſign me great Patrons and able Inſtructors, who, as they would perſwade the World, engaged me to ſit down and pen a Series of Falſhoods, in order to impoſe upon my Countrymen; whereas I am no more than a poor, plain *Briton*, fond of purſuing Truth, and fearleſs of the Conſequences which may attend that Purſuit. I thought there were ſome Things which I could place in ſuch a Light, as might deſerve your Eye, and that of the Publick. I thought the Liberty of the Preſs conſiſted in a Licence to write any thing conſiſtent with the Laws, without ſuffering either in one's Perſon or Character. I thought that ſuch as were Champions

* Common Senſe, *Saturday, January* 3, 1741.
† Craftſman, *January* 10, 1741.
‡ Common Senſe, *Saturday, January* 10, 1741.

Champions for this Liberty, would have been tender of treating any one ill, for making Uſe of it. But, to my Coſt, I find I am miſtaken; for the ſame worthy Gentleman who calls me Sycophant without Cauſe, would queſtionleſs, were he Secretary of State, ſend me to Goal without a Reaſon.

But, ſuppoſing that I had been endowed with ſo much Meekneſs of Spirit, as would have enabled me to have born the Buffetings of the Patriots with Patience, yet, certainly, in ſo doing I ſhould have betrayed the Cauſe of Truth; I ſhould have ſunk below the Character of a Freeholder, and have left my Readers under ſome doubt, whether I had really that Concern for my Country, which in my former I laid Claim to. For this Cauſe chiefly, I again take up the Pen, with a thorough Reſolution to refute the Arguments of my foul-mouthed Adverſaries, without throwing them back any Part of their Billingſgate. Whatever ſhare of Fame they may have acquired by Scurrility, and Scandal; if any thing can be called Fame, that is ſo acquired, let them enjoy it for me; I can bear with Patience any Cenſure that may be paſſed on my Writings, provided none with Juſtice ſay that I write like them.

I know very well, that their Manner of proceeding hath in it ſomewhat of Art, though much more of Nature. The Writers

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in the Cauſe of modern Patriotiſm, find it neceſſary to allow no Man either Senſe or Sincerity that writes againſt them, for fear the People ſhould give ſome Heed to what he ſays, and be thereby animated to a ſtrict Enquiry. This is their Misfortune, and I pity them under it; though that is more than they deſerve, conſidering it is entirely their own ſeeking. All who liſt in the Cauſe of Faction are Volunteers, there is no preſſing Men into this Service; and, conſidering the hard Duty they are put upon, I ſhould wonder that any remain in it, if I did not ſee ſome Examples of a like Stubborneſs in other Aſſociations, which I do not think it neceſſary to name.

This very Practice of theirs, of abuſing indiſcriminately every Man with whom they argue, is one of the ſtrongeſt Proofs that can be, of the Weakneſs of their Cauſe, as well as of the Meanneſs of their Hearts. In all Controverſies, of how great Conſequence ſoever, Men, who are concerned only for Truth, write with Patience againſt all whom they think worth refuting; but, when Intereſt or Prejudice influence Mens Minds, they dare not write with Decency, and therefore charge the Faults they are conſcious of in themſelves, upon ſuch as oppoſe them. This is but too viſible in moſt of the Controverſies which have been carried on of late

Years,

Years, but never appeared ſo glaringly as in our Political Diſputes for ſome time paſt. Thoſe who would paſs for Patriots are (or at leaſt would appear) ſo thoroughly perſwaded of the Juſtice of their Cauſe, that they will not ſuffer it to be examined; and have ſo ſtrong a Senſe of their own Probity, that they ſuſpect every Man's Morals who does not range himſelf on their Side.

This, for ought I can perceive, is the ſole Cauſe of their Reflections upon me, and therefore I think I cannot enter better upon my Juſtification, than by ſhewing that the Cauſe I eſpouſe is no probable Preſumption againſt my having as much Senſe and Probity as any of theſe writing Gentlemen, or their Patrons. The boldeſt of them cannot deny that we enjoy at preſent a great many Advantages. The Crown claims no unintelligible or inſupportable Prerogatives, the ordinary Courts of Judicature are always open, always uninfluenced, and unreſtrained in their Proceedings. Our Parliament ſit annually, our Members ſpeak freely. The Preſs enjoys unuſual Liberty, and no Man ſuffers for his ſpeculative Opinions, either in Government or Religion. Why then does it follow that a Man is a Rogue for liking the Situation he is in? the pretended Patriots make no Secret of their deſiring great Alterations, and muſt we be afraid of confeſſing our Diſ-

like to change? they tell us indeed, that the Body Politick is much out of order, but their Doctors differ about the Diſeaſe. Some ſay it is a Conſumption, and recommend a Change of Councils, as a kind of political Aſs's Milk. Others will have it a Fever, and nothing will ſerve their Turn but letting Blood. Now, if after hearing all that they ſay, there are a third Sort of Folks who are ſincerely of Opinion, that the State is in good Health, and theſe Phyſicians only in the Vapours, muſt they be tame Spectators of wrong Meaſures in a Caſe where they are ſo nearly concerned? or ought they to be deemed ſuch egregious Blockheads for doubting whether theſe learned Gentlemen will take all the Pains they promiſe without any Regard to Fees? At leaſt, this is not the Way of the World, as they themſelves tell us every Day, and therefore, let them ſay what they will, our Suſpicions are as juſt as their's.

There never was a Civil War raiſed, or a Government overturned, but thoſe who brought about ſuch Miſchiefs talked exactly in the Stile of our Patriots, and were particularly remarkable for treating all that the honeſt People, who were true to their Country and Conſtitution, ſaid, as ſo much Court Cant, and as the viſible Effect of ſlaviſh Dependance. This ought to make the World cautious of receiving every thing for Goſpel, which

which galls People in Power. Tho' it may be true, that all Adminiſtrations have ſome Faults, yet it is as true that an Adminiſtration will be always neceſſary, and conſequently a quick Succeſſion of Changes, which is in Effect having no Adminiſtration at all, cannot be juſtified on this Ground. Such as have nothing in view but the Service of their Friends may be inceſſant in their Endeavours at all Seaſons, but thoſe who are careful of the Publick, and prefer the Nation before any Set of Men in the Nation, will always have Reſpect to the Circumſtances of things, and never preſs a Change where it may be for the worſe. Such Principles may expoſe them in ſeditious Times, when Mens Tempers are on the Fret, and the Populace bewildered by the Propoſition of various Projects, to the Cenſure of Want of Zeal, Want of Courage, or even Want of Honeſty: But their Conſciouſneſs of their own Innocence will enable them to ſupport ſuch Reflections with Patience, and will not hinder them from endeavouring to keep things in their old Situation, as well for the Sake of thoſe who oppoſe them as for their own. True Patriotiſm, like true Religion, is a peaceable Principle which prompts Men to do Good to all, and though it does not take from them the Senſe of Injuries, yet it hinders them from having any Deſire to return them. Who-

ever ſhall ſtrictly conſider this, and compare the Conduct of the ſeveral Parties now ſubſiſting, will, I dare ſay, ſee Cauſe to ſuſpend his Judgment at leaſt, when he hears a Man accuſed as a Spreader of Falſhoods, a Sycophant, and a Poiſoner of the People, for exhorting the Inhabitants of *Great Britain* to ſtick to their preſent Conſtitution, to be content with ſuch Powers as are derived to them from their Anceſtors, and to proclaim no Man a publick Enemy on the bare Evidence of his being in the Service of the Publick. When, I ſay, that ſuch a Perſon will ſee Cauſe to ſuſpend his Judgment, I ſay that you will ſee Cauſe to ſuſpend your's, which is all the Favour I aſk till I have made my Defence, upon which I will now enter without either Heat or Ceremony.

The great Point I have in view is to eſtabliſh the Truth of what I have formerly written to you, by anſwering fully and clearly thoſe Objections which have been made by my Antagoniſts, either as to the Truth of what I aſſerted, or as to the Juſtice of my Concluſions therefrom. In order to put this into the eaſieſt, and moſt perſpicuous Method poſſible, I ſhall take their Objections in the order in which the Matters objected to lie, in my firſt Letter, that the whole Train of their Reaſoning and mine may appear fairly and without any Diſadvantage, ſo that you

without

without Difficulty may judge on which Side the Truth lies. In doing this, I ſhall alſo make Uſe of their own Words, leſt it ſhould be ſurmized that I either weaken the Force of their Arguments, by expreſſing their Senſe after my own Manner, or at leaſt take off that Edge of Wit, with which they boaſt of cutting down all Opponents. I confeſs that this Manner of acting will give both you and I, perhaps, more Trouble than is abſolutely neceſſary; but I am ſo deſirous that Truth ſhould appear, and ſo ready to ſatisfy even theſe Writers themſelves if it be poſſible, that I would willingly ſubmit, not only to this, but to any other kind of Labour for that Purpoſe, as well knowing that the Matters in debate are of ſuch high Importance, as that a thorough Underſtanding of them may prevent our Country's being plunged into Confuſion.

In the Letter I ſay, 'The Deputies from 'the *Dutch* Provinces are by no means to 'be compared with our Members of Parlia-'ment; for this plain and ſhort Reaſon, that 'the Government of our Neighbours is a 'Democracy, whereas hitherto ours is not 'ſo. Amongſt them, the legiſlative Power 'and the executive Power are both in the 'Hands of the People; but becauſe they can-'not manage it themſelves, therefore they 'intruſt certain Individuals to act in the

'Name,

'Name, and by the Authority of the People, 'in ſuch and ſuch Diſtricts. Theſe are pro-'perly Deputies, mere Creatures, and abſo-'lute Dependants on the People, in Virtue 'of the Conſtitution *.' To this it is objected —— *In ſhewing the Difference betwixt* Dutch *Deputies, and* Engliſh *Repreſentatives, there are two Miſrepreſentations:* —— *The* Dutch *Deputies are not, and the* Engliſh *Members certainly are, Creatures of the People in Virtue of the Conſtitution, though our Author is pleaſed to repreſent them quite contrary.* —— *Call the latter by what Name you will, they have no Power but what they derive from the People, and whenever they employ it to their Prejudice, they are* —— *to their Conſtituents* †.

It is juſtly obſerved, by a late accurate Writer ‡ on the Government of the United-Provinces, that though the States-General are the Repreſentatives of the ſeven Provinces, yet they are by no means Sovereigns, that is to ſay, they do not exerciſe Sovereign Authority: On the contrary this belongs to, and is actually executed by the States of each Province: Every Province ſends it's Deputies to the *Hague*, where the States-General, that is

* Letter to a Member of Parliament, *p.* 3.

† Common Senſe, *January* 3, 1741.

‡ M. Janiçon *in his* Etat preſent de la Republique des Provinces-Unies.

is the Body of theſe Deputies, aſſemble: Their Number is not fixed, but is generally ſpeaking about Fifty: Their Votes are not at all regulated by their Number, for every Province has one, and but one Vote, though it ſends perhaps ſixteen or eighteen Deputies: Theſe Deputies do not act according to their own Senſe of the Matters brought before them, but in Obedience to the Inſtructions they received from the Province to which they belong. The States-General cannot make Peace or War, nor ſo much as enter into a Treaty with any foreign Power, they cannot levy Troops or raiſe Money, make Laws, or abrogate them, but in all theſe Caſes, there muſt be the Approbation of the States of each particular Province. In the Provincial States, things are not concluded by a Plurality of Voices, there muſt be a general Concurrence, every City that has a Voice hath alſo a Negative Voice, of theſe there are not leſs than fifty-ſix, and if but one of theſe oppoſe any Queſtion, it cannot paſs: Of this we had a very late Inſtance, in the Acceſſion of this Republick to the Treaty of *Hanover* in 1726, the procuring of which took up little leſs than a whole Year. The Deputies therefore to the States-General are, properly ſpeaking, Embaſſadors from ſeven independant Republicks: The Deputies in the Provincial States are Embaſſadors

baſſadors from ſo many little Sovereignties. Thoſe who have a Right of ſending Deputies, have alſo a Right of directing them; and the Common-Council of every little City in *Holland* is in fact, according to their Conſtitution, the dernier Reſort of Government. This, in as few Words, and with as much Exactneſs as I am able, is the Plan which, from the Lights I have, appears to me the Baſis of that Government with which we are preſent concerned. The next thing therefore to be enquired is, Whether from theſe Premiſſes, my Concluſion, or that of my Antagoniſt, may beſt be juſtified.

It appears from this Account of the Matter, that the *Dutch* Deputies are not Repreſentatives, but mere Delegates, ſubject to Inſtructions, liable to be removed, and ſupported by Wages from their Conſtituents. This, in my Judgment, is ſufficient to demonſtrate that I repreſented the thing fairly to you at firſt. I then obſerved that the Government of *Holland* was a Democracy, or popular Government, and ſo if ever there was a Government that deſerved that Name it certainly is: That the Deputies are not at Liberty to act according to their own Wills is what even my Adverſary will not deny; they muſt therefore act according to the Will of others; and tracing this backward, Step by Step, we come at laſt to the Individuals who

who compoſe the ſeveral Orders, or are Burghers of the ſeveral Cities which have Voices in each of the Provincial States. On the whole, therefore, I think I have made it as plain as the thing poſſibly can be, that the *Dutch* Deputies are Creatures of the People.

The next thing I am to ſhew is, that the Members of an *Engliſh* Houſe of Commons are not ſuch Creatures of the People, which I conceive is not more difficult than to ſhew that two and two make four, or that ſome People are no Saints, though they ſet up for Patriots. In the firſt Place, the Number of our Members is certain, a County, a City, a Borough, are all limited as to the Number they are to chuſe by the Conſtitution; ſecondly, the Powers and Privileges which belong to Members of Parliament, belong to them by Virtue of the Conſtitution, their Conſtituents do indeed give their particular Members a Right to them, but then they can neither leſſen nor increaſe them; thirdly, as Repreſentatives of the Commons of *Great-Britain*, the Members are abſolutely free in their Debates, and in their Votes. The Legal Authority, that is, the Authority veſted by the Conſtitution in the People, reſides, while they are ſitting, in them; and though my Antagoniſt is ſo hardy as to inſinuate, that they may be Traitors to their Conſtituents, for ſo his —— is to be filled up; yet, I

think, the Crime of ſuggeſting this, without any Ground, is a Species of Treaſon no leſs certain, and of which we have Reaſon to ſtand in more Fear. It is indeed an Offence of which ſome People have been already guilty, and which is much to be regretted, their Country has been puniſhed for it; that is to ſay, the Bulk of the People have had their Heads turned with ſtrange Notions, and their Minds poiſoned by ſcandalous Suggeſtions, in conſequence of which a general Licentiouſneſs begins to prevail, the Effects of which may be fatal not only to us, but to our Poſterity.

From a due Conſideration of theſe Points we may eaſily and certainly learn, wherein conſiſts the eſſential Difference between our Form of Government, and that of the United-Provinces; as alſo why ſome People are ſo fond of puzzling this Matter, and of endeavouring to make us confound Repreſentatives with Deputies. In the United-Provinces the ſupreme Power is lodged, as hath been ſhewn, as much as may be in the People. In *Britain* again the ſupreme Power is not in the King, in the Lords, or in the People, but in the King and three Eſtates aſſembled in Parliament. Whoever endeavours to alter this is a Traitor to the Conſtitution, whatever artful Colourings he may make uſe of to hide his Purpoſe. A Counſellor who

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adviſes his Prince to take ſuch Meaſures as may conduce to the rendering himſelf abſolute, is an Enemy to his Country, and I dare ſay nobody doubts it. Neither is there any Reaſon to doubt that ſuch as pretend to put the People upon claiming Powers, to which they have no Title by the Conſtitution, are alſo Enemies to their Country. Becauſe in either Caſe a Tyranny would follow, the Conſtitution would be ſubverted, and the People, notwithſtanding all the fallacious Promiſes made them, irretrievably undone. I cannot let ſlip ſo favourable an Opportunity of explaining a Point which I am abſolutely perſwaded is not thoroughly, or at leaſt not generally, underſtood. The Point is this; that though both we and the *Dutch* are free, yet our Freedom is greater, and more extenſive than their's, and this by reaſon of our Conſtitution. For the Foundation of a limited Monarchy being firmer and broader than that of a Democracy, there is therefore leſs Danger of it's being ſubverted; whence it follows, that larger Bodies of People may be truſted with the Power of electing ſuch as are to execute their Share in the Government under ſuch a Form of Rule, than can be done in the other Caſe, which is the Reaſon why ten times the Number have here a Share in our parliamentary Elections, than have any thing to do with the Deputies in *Holland*.

This ſhows the Advantage of our Conſtitution over their's, and is alſo a manifeſt Proof, that ſuch as, under Pretence of ſupporting the Power of the People, would influence them to render their Repreſentatives, Deputies, would in fact do them no Service; and herein lies the great Secret why a Commonwealth, if it could be ſet up, never would be long maintained here. Deſigning Men may ſo flatter the Populace, with Schemes of ſubjecting Government to the Will of thoſe who ought and muſt be governed, as to create a ſeditious Humour, and a Proneneſs to expect they know not what themſelves; but Reaſon and Experience convinces us, that all this is beſide the Purpoſe, and that inſtead of promoting the Eaſe and Happineſs, ſuch Projects as theſe bring on the People Miſery and Diſtreſs. A View to theſe Conſequences, however remote, firſt inclined me to ſhow the Impropriety of introducing new Terms in reſpect to Members; becauſe it is well known, that ſuch as have in View the changing of Things, begin firſt with changing Words.

In my former Letter I told you frankly, that I thought the modern Method of inſtructing Members how to behave in Parliament was not agreeable to our Conſtitution. This ſeems greatly to have alarmed the Writers I have to deal with. I will firſt refute what they have advanced upon this Subject

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in Oppoſition to what I had laid down, and having done this, I will go on to make it as plain to you as any Point can be made, that what I before offered is the Truth, according to the infallible Rule for adjuſting political Truths amongſt us, I mean the Conſtitution.

One of my Antagoniſts, to overthrow what I had aſſerted, *viz.* 'That the Right of inſtructing is a new Claim,' writes thus. 'As to the Antiquity of the Claim, I refer 'him to Lord *Coke*, where he will find the 'Practice of inſtructing as antient at leaſt as '*Edward* III, of which he gives two re'markable Inſtances; and it hath from 'time to time been ever ſince in conſtant 'Uſe *.'

The Quotation from my Lord *Coke* is falſe, it ſtands 3 *Inſt.* 34. I ſuppoſe it ſhould be the fourth Inſtitute, for there, in the thirty-fourth Page, the Inſtances referred to occur. I will ſet down that in the Reign of *Edward* III, in the Words of Lord *Coke*, and then the Reader will plainly perceive what Credit is due to my Antagoniſt. 'At the 'Parliament holden in 9 *Edw.* III, when a 'Motion was made for a Subſidy to be grant'ed of a new Kind, the Commons anſwer'ed, that they would have Conference with 'thoſe

* Craftſman, *January* 10, 1741.

'thoſe of their ſeveral Countries and Places, 'who had put them in Truſt, before they 'treated of any ſuch Matter *.'

How this proves the Claim of inſtructing I cannot conceive; for nothing can be plainer, than that the Repreſentatives of the Commons meant to inform themſelves by Enquiry, and not to receive Inſtructions from others in an authoritative Way. To put this Matter out of doubt, and to clear up this general Obſervation of Lord *Coke*, I will cite another Inſtance in the ſame Reign, about which there can be no Miſtakes, and from which the true Meaning of the Phraſe in Queſtion will be fully ſhewn.

On the 25th of *Auguſt*, in the 13th Year of his Reign, not long before King *Edward* made a great Inroad into *France*, the Duke of *Cornwall*, Guardian of *England*, in his Name, iſſued Writs for a Parliament to meet fifteen Days after the Feaſt of St *Michael* †. To which Parliament came the Archbiſhop of *Canterbury*, the Biſhop of *Durham*, and Mr *William de la Pole*, from the King then in *France* ‡, to ſhow the Lords and Commons what he had done beyond Sea, and his Condition there, and the Miſchief that had befallen him, and thoſe with him, by reaſon

* 4 Inſtit. Cap. 1. p. 34.
† Clauſ. 13. Ed. III. Par. 2. M. 28. Dorſ.
‡ Rot. Parl. 13. Ed. III. Par. 1. *n.* 4.

reaſon he was not ſupplied from *England*. At the ſame time came Letters to the Earl of *Huntington*, and to the *Pruſſia* Merchants, that the King was in *France*, near *St Quintin's*, with an Army of 15000 Men, and more, ſo as it was hoped, with the Aid of God, he would be honoured through the whole World, and his Liege People ſafe in all Points, and preſerved for ever; then alſo he ſhewed to the great Men and Commons, how that he and others that were with the King, for the Charge they had been at, to have his Allies and others to march with him into *France*, were obliged with him for 300000 *l.* Sterling, or more, and how that the King and his Friends could not honourably depart from thence, without giving his Creditors Satisfaction; and likewiſe that for this Cauſe, and for the Maintenance of him and his Quarrel, which was undertaken by the common Aſſent of them all, and for his Buſineſs on this Side the Water, he ought to be ſupplied with a very great Sum. Whereupon in this great Neceſſity, it was thought convenient to aid him with a very great Sum, or he would be diſhonoured, and he and his People deſtroyed for ever; and it was agreed by the great Men (*les Grantz ont grante*) to give him every tenth Sheaf, Fleece, and Lamb, of their Demeſnes, except of their Bond Tenants. The Commons declare themſelves

ſelves very forward and willing to aſſiſt the King, but they pray the Duke of *Cornwall*, Guardian of *England*, and the Lords, that he would ſummon a Parliament to meet in convenient time; that the mean while they might go into the Country, to endeavour to have an Aid granted, anſwerable to the King's Neceſſity; and they farther pray, that two of the beſt valued Knights might be choſen in every County for that Parliament. Accordingly the Guardian iſſued Writs on the 16th of *November* * for another Parliament to meet eight Days after St *Hillary*, or 20th of *January*, in which the Commons gave the King 30,000 Sacks of Wool, upon certain Conditions compriſed in Indentures made hereupon †; the Clergy gave nothing, becauſe in the eleventh Year of his Reign they gave triennial Tenth toward the War coming on then with the King of *France*, and to pay *Germans*, *Brabanters*, and others confederated with him againſt that King, the three Years being not then expired.

The Point about which the Repreſentatives of the Commons deſired to be informed, was not whether they ſhould grant a Supply, but in what Manner they ſhould grant it, ſo as that it might anſwer the King's immediate Wants, and be levied with leaſt Difficulty

* Cl. 13. Ed. III. Par. 2. M. 1. Dorſ.

† Rot. Parl. 13. Ed. III. Par. 2. *n.* 5, 6, 7.

Difficulty upon the People. The common Method of taxing in thoſe Days was leſs certain, and yet more oppreſſive than any of the Ways now in Uſe, and therefore in ſuch an extraordinary Caſe as this was, where the Needs of their Sovereign were ſo great, and their own Circumſtances none of the beſt, there was certainly a great Deal of Wiſdom, and Loyalty in this Meaſure taken by the Houſe of Commons. But that they wanted Information only, and not Inſtruction in the modern Senſe, appears moſt evidently from hence, that they undertook for a Supply and deſired another Parliament might be called.

On the whole there can be nothing more fallacious than to cite Examples of this Nature, in ſupport of a Practice of a quite different kind. No body ever denied that in certain extraordinary Caſes, the Members of the Houſe of Commons might have Recourſe to their Conſtituents for Information, and in reſpect to this, Lord *Coke* is very clear. 'It 'is alſo the Law and Cuſtom of the Par- 'liament, that when any new Device is 'moved for on the King's Behalf, in Par- 'liament for his Aid, or the like, the Com- 'mons may anſwer, that they tendered the 'King's Eſtate, and are ready to aid the 'ſame, only in this new Device they dare 'not agree without Conference with their 'Countries; whereby it appeareth, that ſuch

'Conference is warrantable by the Law and 'Cuſtom of Parliament *.' This is directly in the Teeth of the new Doctrine of inſtructing Members. For, if Lord *Coke* had dreamt that it was legal, or ſo much as warrantable for Electors to preſcribe to their Repreſentatives, he needed not have expreſſed himſelf with ſo much Caution; beſides, here are two manifeſt Reſtrictions mentioned even in the Caſe of conſulting, *Firſt*, it muſt be in caſe of ſome new Device, on behalf of the Crown, and *Secondly*, this Conſultation muſt be in Virtue of an Order of the Houſe. The Reader will eaſily diſcern by the Pains I have taken in this Matter, that I have nothing in View, but Truth, and the Preſervation of the juſt Rights of the People. This alone inclines me ſo ſtrenuouſly to oppoſe the pretended Right now in Queſtion, there being nothing more certain, than what Lord *Coke* has obſerved, that *Innovations and Novelties in Parliamentary Proceedings, are moſt dangerous, and to be refuſed* †, that is, rejected.

The Inſtances the Writer before mentioned gives in the Reign of King *Charles* II ‡, are quite beſide the Purpoſe; thoſe who were concerned in them, thought the Government on

* 4 Inſtit. cap. 1. p. 14.
† 4 Inſtit. p. 11.
‡ Craftſman, *January* 10, 1741.

on the Point of being diſſolved, took thoſe Steps he mentions, becauſe they were in their Power, and would have taken bolder if they could, but Things at that Time were not ripe. I cannot therefore admit theſe for Precedents in peaceable Times, when our Government is ſtrictly according to our Conſtitution, and when conſequently there ought to be the greateſt Harmony between King and People. My Adverſary alſo ought to have remembered, that many who were concerned in theſe Steps, were inclined to throw the whole Legiſlative Power into the Hands of the Houſe of Commons; for the very ſame Reaſon that ſome Folks are now ſo fond of the People, becauſe they ſeem to be in the ſame Opinions. Whoever conſiders the Libels of thoſe Times, and compares them with the preſent, will, I am afraid, ſee too great a Likeneſs; yet ſure two Governments, or at leaſt two *Engliſh* Governments, were never more unlike. Paſſive Obedience was then the Doctrine of the Church, and of the Court, whereas Principles of Liberty are now recommended from the Throne. The Proteſtant Religion was in the utmoſt Danger, the Poſſeſſor of the Crown was a concealed, the Preſumptive Heir a profeſſed Papiſt. The great View of the Court was to ſecure Parliaments by new Charters, or if that could not be done to govern without

them. We are now void of any Fears about Religion, and if the Conſtitution, or the Peoples Freedom, be in any Danger, it comes from another Quarter, and not from the Court.

As to the *Kentiſh* Petition in King *William*'s Time, I am extreamly obliged to this Writer for mentioning it, eſpecially in the Manner he does; he ſays thoſe concerned therein carried their Claim to an *unjuſtifiable Heighth*, this could not be in reſpect to petitioning, for that they certainly had a Right to do; but their Petition being in the Nature of an Inſtruction, my Antagoniſt, in condemning this, gives Evidence againſt himſelf; and the Reaſon he gives for it, is the beſt that could poſſibly have been given; *They took upon themſelves*, ſays he, *to inſtruct not only their own Repreſentatives, but the whole Houſe of Commons*; —— if this was a juſt Reaſon for cenſuring them, as this Writers owns it was, then all Inſtructions are a like illegal, for as my Lord *Coke* tells us, 'Every Member though he be choſen for 'one particular County or Borough, yet 'when he is returned, and ſits in Parliament, he ſerveth for the whole Realm, for 'the End of his coming thither, as in the 'Writ of his Election appeareth, is general, '*ad faciendum & conſentiendum*, &c *.' It comes

* 4 Inſtit. Cap. 1. p. 14.

comes then to the ſame thing, whether they profeſſedly inſtruct their own Members, or the whole Houſe, they have juſt the ſame Right to do the one as the other. In reſpect to the laſt Inſtance, about the Exciſe Scheme, it is altogether out of the Caſe, ſince many who oppoſed that Scheme declared againſt any Right their Electors had to inſtruct them. Beſides, none aſſerted that Power to be in the People, but thoſe who aſſert it now; and every time a Corporation ſends up an Inſtruction, the Precedent may as well be pleaded, as the Inſtructions then ſent. Either is, without Doubt, ſufficient Evidence of a *Claim*, but the Queſtion is as to the *Right*. A Houſe of Commons once devolved all it's Power upon a Committee, would it be any Proof of their having a Right to do ſo, if from Hiſtory I ſhew *de facto*, they once really did it? No, certainly; neither can a Repetition of illegal Acts make them legal. Thus, I hope, I have, to your Satisfaction, cleared the Objections that have been made againſt the Arguments advanced by me in my former Letter. I ſhall now proceed to ſome other Reaſons why I conceive that this Practice is directly repugnant to the Conſtitution, and might, if it grew into Uſe, prove extremely detrimental to the Public Peace and to the People.

If Electors had any Right to inſtruct their Members, ſo as thereby to direct their Votes, it would limit at leaſt, if not entirely take away, the Freedom of the Houſe of Commons. We all know that things which conſidered in one Light appear juſt and reaſonable, may when they are conſidered in other Lights be found unfit, and impracticable. The Manner of the Houſe of Commons is to view and examine the Matters which come before them in all Lights. But to what Purpoſe would this be, if, before their coming to Parliament, the Point was ſettled for them in their Inſtructions. In ſuch a Caſe could they be called Repreſentatives? My Lord *Coke* ſays, that in caſe of any new Device in favour of the Crown, it was warrantable for the Commons to conſult their Conſtituents; but if a Crotchet comes into the Head of the People, it ſeems, their Repreſentatives ſhall not have leave to conſult ſo much as their Reaſon, the Public Peace, or the Good of the People they repreſent. Surely this is contrary to common Senſe, and never can be ſeriouſly maintained by any Man, who conſiders the Conſequences of what he aſſerts, in reſpect to the Quiet and Welfare of his Country.

In point of Law again, how ſuits this Right of inſtructing with the Frame of the Writ of Summons; by it every County, City,

and

and Borough, is directed to ſend fit Perſons; and my Lord *Coke* ſpends a great deal of Time in ſhewing what Properties a Parliament-Man ſhould have. There would be no Need of all this, if theſe Repreſentatives were to be governed by Inſtructions. The utmoſt Care ought to be taken in electing ſuch as, by their own Judgment, are to decide for their Conſtituents; but there ſeems to be no Reaſon, why the fitteſt Perſons in a Borough ſhould be ſent to Parliament, ſubject to the Directions of ſuch as are leſs fit to judge of publick Affairs than themſelves. Next I ſhould be glad to ſee that Clauſe in the Writ, which requires the Electors to inſtruct their Member; we know with what Care Writs were anciently formed, and we know what Lord *Coke* ſays of the high Nature of the Writs of which we are ſpeaking; is it not ſtrange then, that theſe Writs ſhould deſcend to many minute Particulars, and yet paſs over this which is more material than them all. Beſides, our Books are ſilent. Lord *Coke* ſays there was a Treatiſe, intituled, *Modus tenendi Parliamentum*, framed by Direction of *William the Conqueror*, of which he made great Uſe in the fourth Part of his *Inſtitutes*. How comes it, if there was any ſuch Right, that nothing was ſaid in this Treatiſe concerning Inſtructions to Members? if the Right accrued afterwards, how came

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Lord *Coke* himſelf not to take Notice of it? or, which is ſtill ſtronger, how came all the great Aſſerters of the Peoples Privileges, who have written ſo copiouſly upon Parliaments, never to ſay a Syllable concerning Inſtructions? I mean Inſtructions in the modern Senſe, ſuch a one as that publiſhed ſince my former Letter. Let the Party anſwer this if they can.

The only thing which has the Colour of Reaſon, on the other Side of the Queſtion, is the Neceſſity of applying to their Repreſentatives in regard to the Grievances the People may labour under; now this they may effectually do by Petition. This ſeems to be the moſt reaſonable Way; for the Power of the People being, according to our Conſtitution, veſted in their Repreſentatives, to them they ought naturally to apply; this being, as may be preſumed, one great Reaſon for truſting them with ſo great a Power. As this is rational and probable, ſo our Books tell us it is legal likewiſe. The Right of petitioning, and of being relieved upon Petitions, is a Right which was always claimed, and never diſputed, but in very unſettled Times, and when Parliaments were awed by the Power of ambitious Princes. Since therefore there was always this reaſonable and legal Way for the People to inform their Repreſentatives, either of Grievances

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under which they ſuffered, or of Benefits which they might expect, why ſhould we dream, againſt all the Lights of Reaſon, Law, and Hiſtory, that our Anceſtors claimed a Right of inſtructing, or why ſhould we be ſo fond of creating ſuch a Right to our ſelves? thoſe who contend for this admit, that each County, City, or Borough, can inſtruct it's own Members only, and even this we have ſhewn to be impracticable; whereas, in the other Way of petitioning, the People may freely repreſent whatſoever they think fit to the Houſe of Commons, and ſo put the Matter into a proper Train of Enquiry. Shall we fall out with the eaſieſt, ſafeſt, and moſt advantageous Method, merely becauſe it is legal beyond Diſpute? or ought we to take up with another Way, purely on Account of it's being recommended to us by a Set of Men, who have long made it their Buſineſs to perplex publick Councils, and who have attempted to ſap ſeveral fundamental Parts of our Conſtitution, in hopes of entering by the Breach into Power? Steps like theſe are ſurely unbecoming a wiſe and free People; and if ever we think otherwiſe, Experience will teach us to repent.

The laſt thing which I ſhall at preſent offer againſt the Method I oppoſe, is the Danger of it. Thoſe who ſo warmly eſpouſe it at preſent do it from a Preſumption, that this

Practice may ſerve their Turn for the preſent. Perhaps it might do ſo; but certainly it would be a bad Precedent, and open a Road to the greateſt Miſchiefs hereafter. It is not impoſſible that in ſome future Age, there may ariſe Miniſters as ambitious and as great Enemies to the People as ſome that have lived in Times paſt. If theſe ſhould, as no doubt they would, meet with a vigorous Oppoſition to their Meaſures in the Houſe of Commons, what a terrible Uſe might they make of this Doctrine of inſtructing Members? by the Help of this they might ſcreen themſelves from the Repreſentatives of the People, behind the People themſelves. There would be nothing more wanting than a few ſuch Inſtructions in favour of their Schemes, as we have lately ſeen ſent in ſupport of the Schemes of other People, to countenance ſuch Meaſures as I am afraid to mention. All impartial Writers on our Conſtitution have inſinuated grievous Apprehenſions of what might follow from appealing from their Repreſentatives to the People. If any of my Antagoniſts ſhould think of repreſenting theſe as chimerical Fears, let them remember the *Kentiſh* Petition. It is a Caſe in point. If the Petitioners were not excited, they were at leaſt encouraged, by the Court to act as they did, and we may ſee in the Writings of ſome great Courtiers of thoſe Times, what

plauſible

plauſible Pretences were made Uſe of to fill the Heads of the Populace with a Notion, that they might call Parliaments to account as well as Kings; that is, in plain *Engliſh*, that they might, if they thought fit, demoliſh the Conſtitution, or, which is the ſame thing, ruin and enſlave themſelves. I could ſay a great deal more to this Purpoſe, but I think I have ſaid enough, perhaps too much, already; but you muſt conſider, Sir, that I have been forced to it, and that though I might have offered theſe Reaſons to you before, yet I forbore doing it from an Unwillingneſs to meddle with ſuch tickliſh Subjects, and to ſhew how eaſily popular Schemes might, after ſerving the Ends of a Party, be made Uſe of to the Prejudice of the People.

We are now come to that point, in which your Friends think themſelves ſtrongeſt. 'There is certainly a wide Difference, *ſays my* '*ableſt Antagoniſt*, between the legal *Prerogative* of the *Crown*, and it's *Miniſterial Influence*, as much as this *Scribbler* endeavours to 'ridicule it. That the *Prerogative* hath been 'reſtrained ſince the *Revolution*, I have not 'heard queſtioned; and that *Miniſterial In*-'*fluence* hath increaſed in a greater Propor-'tion, I think is as evident from the Effect, 'which hath and muſt neceſſarily attend the 'great *Number* of *Places*, now at the Diſ-

'poſal of the M——r, which owe their 'Being to the infinite Multiplicity of *Taxes*, 'and the burthenſome *Debts* we labour 'under.'

I am much obliged to this Gentleman, for his good Manners in calling me *Scribbler*, and, I hope, he will be long in a Capacity to call me ſo, for ſhould he ever arrive at the Heighth of his Ambition, a *Title*, and a *Poſt*, he would call me *Traitor* with as little Ceremony, if I ventured to oppoſe him. The Paragraph would have run full as well, and have carried as ſtrong an *Air* of *Patriotiſm*, if there had been no *calling Names*. I therefore take it for granted, that *Scribbler* was put in to ſhew *who* wrote it. There are certain *favourite Expreſſions*, by which *Criticks* diſtinguiſh the Writings of an *Author*, though they are not honoured with his *Name*. From theſe little *Flights* of *Arrogancy* therefore which ſerve to ſhew the *Superiority* of the *Writer*, and to diſtinguiſh him from the *Hackney Scribbler*, we are eaſily led to know who this Mr *Petulant* is. But, as the foregoing Obſervation is the very *Baſis* of all their Arguments, I will conſider it with juſt Attention, and endeavour to make you ſenſible how little Notice is due to this Clamour, about *Miniſterial Influence*.

While the *Crown* poſſeſſed, and exerciſed thoſe *Prerogatives* which have been reſtrained

ed by Law, at, or ſince the *Revolution*, the *Court Influence* was really terrible enough to raiſe ſtrong Apprehenſions in the People. In the Memoirs of Sir *William Temple*, in thoſe of Sir *John Rereſby*, in the Diary of Mr *Aſhmole*, we find it expreſsly affirmed that King *Charles*, and King *James*, ſent for ſuch Gentlemen as they thought they could *depend upon*, put them upon being *Candidates*, and aſſiſted them with all the *Weight* the *Crown* could give at their *Elections*, nay ſometimes laid their *Commands* upon ſuch as would otherwiſe have *oppoſed them*, to deſiſt. Wherefore, while this Method of Proceeding was practicable, *Court*, and *Country Intereſt* were proper Diſtinctions; but the Miſchief was, that theſe *Diſtinctions* ſubſiſted, or were revived, after their Cauſe was taken away; and of this we ſhall preſently ſee the Reaſon.

Amongſt thoſe who had ſet themſelves with Vigour to oppoſe the Exorbitancies of the Princes I have juſt mentioned, as there were many who acted purely from publick Spirit, and Love to their Country; ſo there were ſome, who, though they made the loudeſt Pretences to theſe laudable Qualities, were in reality influenced by very different Notions; ſuch as, Diſlike to Monarchy, an eager Ambition of being at the Head of Affairs, or a greedy Deſire of fingering Publick

lick Money. Hence it followed, that though the *Revolution* took away all juſt Cauſes of Complaint, againſt the *Power* of the *Crown*, and though the perſonal Conduct of the Prince who wore it was ſuch as might have ſatisfied even the *warmeſt Patriot*; yet ſo far was the *Spirit* of *Oppoſition* from being extinguiſhed, that, before the Government was well reſettled, it broke out again, with as great Violence as ever; and which was not a little extraordinary, ſome who had gone the *greateſt Lengths* with *former Courts*, finding themſelves out of Credit, became bittter Enemies to that *Power*, which they knew they ſhould *never poſſeſs*; and with equal Art and Obſtinacy, proſecuted their diſloyal Deſign of *thwarting* the *King's Meaſures* upon all Occaſions, out of their abundant Care (as they would have had it underſtood) of the Safety and Welfare of the Nation.

The Wars in *Ireland*, and in *Flanders*, the Diſtreſſes of the Government at home, and thoſe Jealouſies the common People are always apt to entertain, when their Princes have any Concerns abroad, gave theſe artful and ambitious Men a fair Opportunity of exerting their Eloquence to ſome Purpoſe. All who were diſaffected with the late Change in the Government, all the diſcontented who had no Hopes but in the Change of a Miniſtry, all that affected a Republick,

and

and all who were weak enough to be miſled by plauſible Pretences of publick Spirit, joined in the glorious Project of *croſſing* a *Court*, which, as it owed it's *Being* to a *Country Intereſt*, muſt neceſſarily have *relied* upon it for *Support*. Repeated Diſappointments, and a continued Series of Misfortunes, at length obliged ſome in the Adminiſtration to make Uſe of Methods, of which otherwiſe they had never had a thought; that is to ſay, it obliged them to have Recourſe to the *Means* which they had in their *Hands* of *contenting* ſome, and *quieting* others, and thereby procuring to themſelves a Capacity of ſo *ſteering* the *Veſſel* of *State*, as to weather ſeveral *ſevere Storms*; by each of which otherwiſe ſhe muſt have ſuffered *Shipwreck*. Thus the *Perverſeneſs* of *pretended Patriots* produced what they call *Miniſterial Influence*.

Whoever lived in thoſe Times, whoever has read the moſt impartial Hiſtories of King *William*'s Reign, will own to you that I have repreſented this Matter fairly. And now, Sir, lay your Hand upon your Breaſt, conſider the Situation of a *Miniſtry*, preſſed on one hand by the *powerful Enemies* of their *King* and *Country*, and diſtreſſed on the other by *pretended Patriots*; *reproached* by the *latter*, if the *former* gained any *Advantages*, and unable to *deal* with the *former* till they found ſome Means of *pacifying* the *latter*. In ſuch a Caſe,

a Caſe, Sir, what would you have *Men* do? For Miniſters are Men, and while they are ſo, it is unjuſt to expect from them either Virtue or Wiſdom ſuperior to Mortals. If ſuch as had *Talents* for *Popularity* would exert them to the Prejudice of the *State*, merely becauſe they wanted *Places*, would you condemn, as *Enemies* to their *Country*, ſuch as gratified them rather than ſee the *State* periſh. If Men, after acquiring a *Reputation* by *ſpeeching* for the *Publick*, will not allow others to *act* for the *Publick* without a *Reward* for not being *troubleſome*, what is to be done? If Regard to the Government did not direct an *Adminiſtration* in ſuch Emergencies, Principles of Self-Preſervation would. The Crown at that Time had loſt the *Powers* by which it was accuſtomed to promote it's *Meaſures*, and ſecure it's *Servants*, and therefore it was obliged to ſtoop to the only *Means* of *Safety* that were *left*.

As to the heavy Burden of the *publick Debts*, and in conſequence of them the *grievous Load* of numerous *Taxes*, we owe them entirely to the *pretended Patriots* of thoſe Times, who, while they were pocketing Bribes for the *parſimonious Supplies* they permitted the *Commons* to give to the *Crown*, were at the ſame Time heaping *Debts* and entailing *Taxes* upon *Poſterity*, that they, and their deluſive Eloquence, might deſerve

Curſes

Curſes *in Secula Seculorum.* Yet your Friends, the *worthy Succeſſors*, Sir, of the *Grumblers* in the laſt Century, have the Confidence to place theſe *tokens*, by which we ought to remember their *Predeceſſors*, to the Account of *Miniſters*, and would have us gratefully abhor the Memory of *thoſe Men*, who preſerved us from being quite *undone.* If indeed they are morally certain that the People will never open their Eyes, I do not know but they may carry their Point, and be as loudly huzza'd for running down *thoſe* who are now at the *Helm*, as the *old Patriots* were for baniſhing *Clarendon*, depriving *Somers* of the *Seals*, and breaking the Heart of the uncorrupt and publick ſpirited *Godolphin!*

Beſides, when thoſe who courted the Favour of the People had, to ingratiate themſelves, hindered the neceſſary Supplies for defraying the current Expences of the Government, and thereby created *Debts*, and *Taxes*, it became abſolutely neceſſary that the *Receipt* and *Direction* of theſe ſhould be in *Officers* appointed by the Crown; had it been otherwiſe, not only *Debts*, and *Taxes*, but *Faction* alſo had been eſtabliſhed, and we ſhould have had *two kinds* of *Government* in one *Commonwealth.* 'Tis true, ſomething of this Sort was attempted in the Reign of which I have been ſpeaking: Some *Patriot Commiſſioners* were elected, and great Powers

given them by the Legiſlature, but ſo far were they from doing any of the great Things that were expected from or promiſed by them, that except terrifying publick Officers, cauſing Loads of Accounts to be tranſcribed at the publick Expence, and finding Fault with Perſons with whom they had nothing to do, the People reaped no Fruit from their Labours; and from a juſt Senſe of this they were at laſt very prudently laid aſide. Happy would it be for us, if we did not think ourſelves too wiſe to be guided by Experience, we ſhould then diſtinguiſh eaſily between feaſible and impracticable Projects, and be content to truſt the *Crown* with thoſe *Powers*, which would be infinitely more dangerous, even to the *People* themſelves, if they were in *other Hands*.

On the whole, your Friends reaſon from a Set of *groſs Falſhoods*, as if they were *ſelf-evident Principles*, and this it is that gives them that *Air* of *Confidence* with which they *ſpeak* and *write*. For example, they take it for granted, that there is a *natural Oppoſition* between the *Intereſts* of the *Crown* and *People*, though nothing is more certain than that they are, and always ought to be, *the ſame*. They define *Patriotiſm*, or at leaſt they act as if they defined it, *an Averſion to Power*, however it may be uſed. At the ſame Time they endeavour to perſwade the People,

People, that the ſureſt *Sign* of a *publick Spirit* is the *diſturbing* and *diſtracting publick Councils*. In ſhort, their having *no Places* puts them upon repreſenting a *Place* as a Proof either of *Iniquity* or *Incapacity*; and their finding that the Juſtice, Equity, and Mildneſs, of the preſent *Adminiſtration*, together with their Punctuality in all their Dealings, and their Tenderneſs in executing Penal Laws, hath given them a great *Intereſt* in the *People*, they will needs give this an ill Name, and to anſwer their own pernicious Purpoſes, have the Aſſurance to call the Effects of the King's *good* and *gracious* Government, *Miniſterial Influence*.

It is charged upon me as an Inſtance either of Weakneſs or Inſincerity, that I ſhould object to the Place-Bill, that it is an *Invaſion on the Peoples Liberty*, and yet all that I advanced is granted, for it could not be denied; and now to ſhew that if I am a Blockhead, I am a Blockhead of ſome Reading, I will diſcover whence I had this Notion, that diſqualifying any Perſon from ſerving his Country in Parliament, is a great Treſpaſs on the Right of the People, and extreamly dangerous to our Conſtitution. Lord *Coke* tells us *, that the King cannot grant a Charter of Exemption to any Man to be freed from Election of

* 4 Inſtit. p. 49.

Knight, Citizen, or Burgeſs of the Parliament, as he may do of ſome inferior Offices or Places; becauſe the Elections of them ought to be free, and his Attendance is for the Service of the whole Realm, and for the Benefit of the King, and his People, and the whole Common-wealth hath an Intereſt therein. It may, indeed, be ſaid, that this relates to the King, and ſhews that he ought not to wound the Conſtitution in this Particular; but ſure the Reaſon of our great Lawyer's Remark is general, for a Wound is a Wound come from what Hand it will. However, to ſhew that Lord *Coke* thought any Reſtraint of this Sort unlawful alike in Prince and in People, I muſt take Notice that he cenſures, with great Quickneſs, an Attempt made to exclude Lawyers from ſitting in the Houſe of Commons. There was, it ſeems, in the Time of *Edward* III, a popular Clamour againſt Lawyers, as now there is againſt Place-men; and in the forty-ſixth Year of his Reign, there was an Ordinance made in the Houſe of Lords to diſable them from being elected. *Henry* IV, in the ſixth Year of his Reign, to gratify the People, inſerted a Clauſe in a Writ of Summons, prohibiting the Election of any Lawyer. This Parliament, without Lawyers, met at *Coventry*, and ſuch mad Work they made on it, that, to this Day, they are ſtiled in our Books

Books *Indoctum Parliamentum*, or, in good old *Engliſh*, the *Lack-Learning Parliament*. This had a good Effect, it cured the People of their Prejudices, and they have never ſince thought of turning Lawyers out of Parliament. It is clear, therefore, that I am not alone in my Judgment, that Reſtraints on the Freedom of the People, in this Particular, how plauſible ſoever the Pretences for reſtraining appear, are certainly dangerous, it may be deſtructive, of our Conſtitution. I muſt add, before I quit this Subject, that if my Lord *Coke*'s Opinion was of Weight, when there was no Qualification in point of Eſtate neceſſary to a Seat in Parliament, it is much more ſo now.

But if theſe Gentlemen can't prove me an Offender againſt Reaſon, they will ſtrive hard to convict me of writing againſt the Laws. There are, it ſeems, certain Place-men diſabled by Act of Parliament from ſitting in the Houſe of Commons, and, if I perſiſt in my Opinion, it ſeems to them that I doubt of the Wiſdom of this Act; but, with Submiſſion to theſe quick Wits, I do not argue for the Repeal of this Law, but I argue againſt a Crotchet of their's which is not a Law yet: Some Place-men are excluded, *ergo* more Place-men ought to be excluded. If this be good Logick, then, ſay I, the preſent Qualifications in Land are reaſonable;

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therefore to double theſe Qualifications would be twice as reaſonable, and thus we may go on ſecuring the Houſe of Commons, till we ſhut them out of Doors. This they may call awkwardly ridiculing their Scheme, but I proteſt I mean no ſuch Thing, I have no Ambition to paſs for a Wit, and therefore thoſe who have cannot mortify me by calling me a Blockhead. All that I pretend to ſay is, that a Multiplication of Reſtraints on Liberty is the direct Road to taking it quite away. This is a plain, ſelf-evident, home-ſpun Truth, and if theſe Gentlemen with their Learning, Spirit, Eloquence, and all that, can prevail upon the People to believe the contrary, why they will be very cleaver Fellows; the Wit will lie all on their Side; and as to Wiſdom it will be out of the Queſtion.

My Antagoniſts are agreed in one Point, and that is, that I am guilty of a groſs Contradiction in ridiculing (for ſo they will have it) the People's demanding a Place-Bill, becauſe it reſtrains their Liberty, and, at the ſame Time, applauding their Anceſtors for giving up their Right of electing Sheriffs. If I piqued myſelf as little on good Manners as theſe Writers do, I ſhould ſay, that the Parent of this Contradiction is their *groſs Ignorance*. People may be *Patriots* and *Politicians* it ſeems by Intuition, but I find to make

make Men *Lawyers* there muſt be a *little reading*. The People did *give up* their *Right* of *electing Sheriffs*, and I commend them for it; but they did not *give it away*, otherwiſe I would not have commended them. I did not intend in that Letter to *read* to you, Sir, upon the *Statute* of *Sheriffs*, I knew you would comprehend very readily the *Hint* I gave; but theſe People are ſo alert on their *new Notions* of *Liberty*, and ſo fond of ſhewing their *Spite* to the *Crown*, that they take Fire not only on every Occaſion, but, on every Shadow of Occaſion, the Source of their Reflections lying here in the *Sound* of the *Words*, and not in their *Meaning*. For be it known unto them, that I as little deſire to ſee the People give up their *Rights* to the *Crown*, as their *Votes* to the *preſent Patriots*. I thank God, I mean the *People* better than to wiſh them *Slaves* to any *Prince*, much leſs to any *Set* of *Subjects* who have no Title to Dominion, but what lies in their *ſublime Senſe* of their *own Abilities*.

I paſs now to another Abſurdity they ſay I have run into, which is alledging that the Place-Bill fixes a *Mark* of *Reproach* on thoſe whom it excludes from *ſitting* in the *Houſe* of *Commons*, or, to uſe the Words which they are pleaſed to make me uſe, puts them, in this Reſpect, upon the ſame Foot with

outlawed

outlawed Perſons. I am ſtill as blind as ever, and, in ſpite of all their Illuſtrations, cannot ſee any Abſurdity in what I advanced. They make no Scruple of owning, that their turning Place-men *out*, is becauſe they think the People have Grounds to be diſſatisfied with their Conduct *in* Parliament, and yet they are angry with me for ſaying, that ſuch an Excluſion as this is diſhonourable to the *Perſons excluded.* At this Rate I proteſt I am afraid I ſhall never ſay any thing to pleaſe them; for if ſtripping a Man of a *Truſt* of *Honour* and *Importance*, from an Opinion that he will *betray it*, fixes no Sort of Diſcredit upon that *Man*, why then I am what theſe Gentlemen would have me, a Blockhead in good Earneſt. Nay, to ſhew them how thick my Skull is, I will confeſs, that notwithſtanding all the Pains they have taken about it, I am not convinced of the Truth of either of the *Inſtances* they give me. Firſt, they ſay that many uſeful Members of the Common-wealth are incapacitated, and yet are not looked upon as Enemies to their Country. Now I conceive there is ſome little Difference between a Man's being *kept out* of *Parliament* for want of a *legal Capacity*, and being *turned out* of it, though he has *all* that the Law requires. Next they inſinuate that I would throw ſome Reproach on *monied Men*; becauſe, truly, a Man who

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is worth a *Million* cannot ſit in the *Houſe* of *Commons*. But if this Man will lay out *Ten thouſand Pound* in *Land*, he may ſit there the next Day; and this very Proviſion is one of the Cauſes of the *high Value* ſet upon *Land*. By their *Scheme*, however, it is to be enacted, that if a Man has a *Place*, that is, *ſerves* his *Country* by the *Favour* of his *Prince*, he ſhall *not ſit* in the *Houſe* of *Commons*, tho' he be born to *ten thouſand* a *Year*. I have now got rid of every thing but the Word *outlawed*, and as to this, I ſay, if a Man be excommunicated or outlawed, his being *duly elected* will not give him a *Seat* in *Parliament*, though he has all other *legal Qualifications*: By this Bill a *Perſon* with *thoſe Qualifications* is to be excluded, if he has a *Place*; the Queſtion is, Whether this does not make him look ſomewhat like an *Outlaw?*

The Writers againſt me are very angry with what they call my *begging* of *Queſtions*, though, by the Way, they have not ſhewn much Generoſity themſelves in granting my Requeſts. They are *ſurprized* that I ſhould ſay, that the *Servants* of the *Crown* are in *reality* the *Servants* of the *People*, and that the *Money* of the *Crown* is the *Money* of the *People*. Now, if *Surprize* be any Sort of *Proof*, why I proteſt ſolemnly, Sir, I was never ſo *ſurprized* in my Life; I took theſe very *Expreſſions* out of their *own Mouths*,

and now, look you, to ſpight *me* they will give themſelves the *Lye*. Well, let the worſt come to the worſt, I can prove it, and I will prove it, rather than the *People* ſhall *loſe* their *Servants*, or *their Servants* think they are accountable only to the *Crown*. The executive Part of the Government is given to the *King* by *Law*, but it is given to the *King* for the *Sake* of the *People*; and therefore, as he cannot execute the Government without employing *Part* of his *People*, who are thence ſtiled *Miniſters*, they are accountable for what they do to *the People*: This is carried ſo far, that the very *Command* of the *Prince* is held no Warrant in Law for their doing any thing to the *Prejudice* of the *People*; nay, and though the King can *pardon* any of his *People*, for any Offence, yet he cannot *pardon* his *Miniſters* if they are *impeached* by the *People*; therefore I ſaid, and I ſaid not without Reaſon, that the *Servants* of the *Crown* were, in reality, *Servants* of the *People*; and I think I might have ſaid, that they are not ſo much the *Servants* of the *Crown* as of the *People*. Now again, as to the *Money* that pays them, do we not all know that it is granted by the *People* for the Support of the *Government*, which is ſo neceſſary to themſelves, that if it was diſſolved, it would be a great Queſtion whether they would have any *Property* left? But, ſay my

 Antagoniſts,

Antagoniſts, the *Money* of the *Publick* has been ſometimes *uſed* againſt the *Liberties* of the *People*, and *publick Officers* have *cheated* the *People*. Did I deny this? did I ſay that the *former* was not the *vileſt* of *Crimes*, or that the *latter* did not deſerve the *ſevereſt Puniſhments*? Would they infer that the Government ſhould have no *Supplies*, becauſe the *Money* may be *miſapplied*? or would they have it taken for granted that every *Man* in *Place cheats*, becauſe *ſome* have *done ſo*. If they would, I am ſure they need not talk of *begging* of *Queſtions*. The Truth is, there are ſome *Beggars* of *Places*, who after ſuing, and being refuſed by the *Crown*, are now begging and praying the *Commons* of *Great-Britain* to be out of Humour, *right* or *wrong*, with all *their Servants*, that they may conſole themſelves for the *Want* of *Places*, by providing that no Man who has a *Place* ſhall have *Peace*.

Both the Writers, who have obliged the World with Remarks on my Letter, talk loudly of ſmall venal Boroughs, which they are pleaſed to call the rotten Part of the Conſtitution: One of them is more explicit than the other, I will therefore quote what he ſays. * ‘ That Members ought to be ‘ freely elected by the People is true; but

* Common Senſe, *January* 10, 1741.

'are not many Boroughs, that ſtill retain 'their Right of ſending Members to Parlia-'ment, gone to decay? When Trade and 'Manufactures ſink in any Town, the Peo-'ple leave it of Courſe, and ſettle where they 'can find Employment: —— The Right of 'electing does not follow the People; the 'more the Pity. —— Several *Corniſh* and '*Wiltſhire* Boroughs, quite deſerted, ſend 'two Members each to Parliament; while '*Birmingham*, *Leeds*, *Wakefield*, and many 'other large and populous Towns do not 'ſend one.——A Member for the County 'of *York* repreſents Ten thouſand Freehol-'ders; yet his Vote counts for no more than 'that of a Man who repreſents twenty (I 'will not ſay Exciſe-Men, or Cuſtom-Houſe 'Officers) but poor Labourers.'

Becauſe many People are apt to fancy there is ſome Weight in theſe Sort of Objections, I beg leave to obſerve to you, Sir, that theſe Grievances, if they are any, flow not from Monarchs, or their Miniſters, but from the Projects of Patriots in former Times; whence it follows, that there is no ſuch thing as adjuſting the Conſtitution to the good liking of theſe Sort of People, who demand a thing in one Age, and rail againſt it in the next: Now to make this the more clearly appear, I will examine ſeparately the Griefs of which this Writer at preſent complains.

First

Firſt then, he is angry that Abundance of poor Boroughs ſhould be truſted with the Privilege of ſending Members to Parliament: But does he know how this comes to paſs? Heretofore Sheriffs were wont to excuſe ſuch Boroughs as they found in no Condition to ſend Repreſentatives to Parliament, either through their great Poverty, which rendered it inconvenient for them to pay the Wages of the Burgeſſes they ſhould have ſent to Parliament, and which Cauſe is frequently expreſſed in their Returns; or elſe, becauſe they wanted fit Perſons reſident in them to become their Repreſentatives. This Practice continued throughout ſeveral Kings Reigns, without any Complaint from the Boroughs againſt the Sheriffs; though it be true, that ſome Statutes were made which ſeem intended to have reſtrained this Practice. Some Patriots however, conceiving this too great a Power to be veſted in any Sheriff, procured it to be wholly taken away by a Statute made 23 *Hen.* VI. Yet notwithſtanding this Statute it ſeems, that for a long Time decayed Boroughs had no Precepts ſent them, inſomuch that, in the Reign of *Henry* VIII, there were not above One hundred and thirty Cities and Boroughs which ſent Members to Parliament. But afterwards, as Times altered, and Towns began to affect ſending Members to Parliament, inſtead

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of declining it as they were wont to do, ſeveral antiquated Boroughs deſired to be reſtored; and upon Petition, ſeveral of them were ſo, by the Authority of the Crown: As for Inſtance, the Borough of *Eaſt-Retford*, in the County of *Nottingham*, though it had ſent no Members from 9 *Edw.* II, yet it was reſtored to a Right of ſending in 13 *Eliz.* and by this means many decayed Boroughs re-acquired their Rights. In proceſs of Time the Houſe of Commons alſo took upon them to reſtore or revive decayed Boroughs, as particularly in the 18 of *James* I, they ordered a Writ for electing Burgeſſes for *Ilcheſter*, in the County of *Somerſet*, though that Borough had made but one Return from 34 *Edw.* III; and in the 15 *Charles* I, *Milburn-Port*, in the ſame County, recovered it's Right of ſending Repreſentatives in the like Manner, though it had ſent none from the Time of *Edward* I. If therefore there be really any Hardſhip that a Member for the County of *York* ſhould be equal in Parliament only to the Repreſentative of Twenty poor Labourers, here is the Cauſe; and, as I ſaid before, neither Monarchs, nor Miniſters, are juſtly accountable for it.

Secondly, it is much lamented that many great and opulent Market Towns, which are Places of great Trade and Conſequence, ſhould yet be without this Right of ſending Members

Members to Parliament: But to what is this due? Heretofore, our Kings granted a Right of ſending Repreſentatives by Charter, and this gave them an Opportunity of incorporating flouriſhing Towns, and of rewarding ſuch Places as had diſtinguiſhed themſelves in an eminent Manner by their Loyalty. This Power Queen *Elizabeth* exerciſed very frequently, ſhe added upwards of a hundred Members to Parliament; it was exerted, but more ſparingly, by King *James* I, who gave this Right to Twenty-ſeven Boroughs. King *Charles* I, added Ten, but in King *Charles* the Second's Time, the Houſe of Commons queſtioned this Right, declared Elections in Virtue of his Charters void, and conſequently the Power of the Crown in that Reſpect was reſtrained; which ſome Writers on Parliamentary Affairs have applauded as a high Act of Patriotiſm, and of vaſt advantage to the People in general.

From all this, Sir, we ought to learn that too much Care and Caution cannot be taken in ſuch Proceedings, as regard our Conſtitution. What at one Period of Time appears highly for the Intereſt of the People, is at another judged a Grievance; and though nothing is held, generally ſpeaking, more for the Advantage of the Commons than pruning the Prerogatives of the Crown, yet we find that ſometimes the People felt the Want

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of them more perhaps than the Crown itſelf. Inſtead therefore of that Eagerneſs and Paſſion with which all popular Projects are purſued, inſtead of all thoſe fiery Denunciations of Corruption and Contempt of publick Spirit, againſt all who oppoſe them; it were to be wiſhed that our Patriots would have Recourſe to milder Meaſures, and endeavour rather to perſwade us by Arguments, than to terrify us with Threats. I proteſt, I am very apprehenſive of the Conſequences that may attend the raſh Propoſals and haſty Language which are in faſhion with moſt of your Friends. If the Goodneſs of the King, and the Moderation of the Miniſtry, hinder any Notice from being taken of the many rank Libels daily publiſhed, yet do I not ſee how you will be ſecure from the People themſelves, if your Speakers, and your Scribes go on at the Rate they do, and diſcover ſuch ſtrong Inclinations towards new modelling the Conſtitution according to Schemes with which hitherto but few are acquainted.

It appears clearly enough, that whenever you can carry a Place-Bill you will not ſtop there. The depriving moſt of the Boroughs in *Cornwall*, and *Wilts*, of the Power of ſending Members, by way of Puniſhment for not ſending ſooner Members of your Stamp, is pretty ſtrongly intimated, though to be ſure you will deny any Intention of this

Sort

Sort in the moſt ſolemn Manner, till you are in a Condition to execute it. I could alſo mention ſome other Regulations, of which, from Time to Time, your Writers have afforded us ſuch Hints, as ſhew we may expect great Changes, whenever their Patrons get into Power; but I forbear at preſent, becauſe I doubt my Paper will fail me before I come to an End of what I propoſed. Let me therefore conclude this Subject with putting you in Mind, that if any thing of this Sort was but hinted by a Servant of the Crown, or a Friend to the Adminiſtration, your Friends would not fail to raiſe a Hue and Cry after him, as if he had already ſtolen a part of the Conſtitution. I, for my part, know no Right by which a Patriot, ſuppoſing every Journal Writer in the Service of your Party to be ſuch, is at liberty to offer Amendments of our eſtabliſhed Government to the People out of Parliament, and to provoke them to think they are ill treated, if theſe Propoſals are not immediately conſidered by the Legiſlature. If you ſay that theſe Rights are inherent to a free People, I muſt anſwer, that they ought then very cautiouſly to be uſed, ſince it is certain nothing can be more dangerous to our Liberties than ſuch Diſcourſes. They have been dangerous, I might ſay, deſtructive to every free State

which has ſubſiſted in the World; and I do not think that we have at preſent a larger Share of Virtue and publick Spirit than ever the *Athenians*, *Carthaginians*, or *Romans*, poſſeſſed. I have likewiſe ſome Doubts, whether when they perceive you are in earneſt with theſe Schemes, the People will not think themſelves more concerned in their Events, than in that of the War; which however you would make us believe is your principal Care. Certainly theſe are Hints not altogether unworthy your Notice, though they come from a Man who pretends not either to a Right, or an Ability of inſtructing you.

I come now to the laſt great Objection, which is, that ſome of theſe leſſer Boroughs are under the Influence of the Adminiſtration: Upon this, I know, your Party lay a great Streſs, and to my great Surprize my Antagoniſts appeal to me as if I either did, or might, know ſomething of this Matter; whereas I ſolemnly declare, there is no Man in the Kingdom more ignorant in Arts of this Nature than I am; however, the great Deſire I have of contributing ſo far as may be to the withdrawing you from ſome ſtrange Opinions you have entertained, on what Grounds I know not, I will endeavour to ſhew you what in my Judgment hath given

Riſe

Riſe to this Clamour, and the Reaſons why I apprehend it is ill founded, and therefore no fit Cauſe for introducing a new Law, for reſtaining the Subjects of *Great Britain* in their Choice of Repreſentatives; and creating, as it infallibly would do, ſeperate Intereſts, in ſuch as have the legiſlative and executive Powers intruſted with them; and this I ſhall do as fairly, as freely, and in as few Words, as I can; which I hope will induce you to hear me with Patience at leaſt, if not with Favour; though that indeed is a Favour I ſhould ſcarce expect from any of the Party but yourſelf.

We are never to expect Perfection in any human Contrivance; and therefore, all that can be hoped for in a political Conſtitution, is this; that it ſhould appear excellent in the Eyes of the wiſeſt, and be allowed practicable by all; which Character is certainly due to our Conſtitution as it ſtands at preſent. This, however, does not hinder many different Opinions in relation thereto, nor will any Alteration we can poſſibly make, bring us to Unanimity in our Sentiments about it. Our Patriots themſelves own, that there ever will be an Oppoſition; nay, they go farther, they affirm, there ever muſt, and ought to be one. Hence it follows, that if the Nation muſt be always ſplit into two Par-

ties, the People ought to take care to keep them as equal as poſſible, ſince which ever conquers, they muſt moſt certainly be Slaves. When I ſay this, I mean an abſolute Conqueſt, for one will be always the prevailing Party; that is to ſay, while the Adminiſtration adheres to the Principles of natural Juſtice, and to the Rules preſcribed by the Conſtitution, the Court will have the Aſcendant; but whenever Miniſters deviate from ſuch a Conduct, though they may maintain themſelves for ſome ſmall Time, yet at laſt the Scale of the Oppoſition will prevail, till new Weights are thrown into the other. Now each of theſe Parties makes uſe of all ſuch Ways and Means, as the Conſtitution will allow for its Support. Theſe Methods, the Party uſing them, ſtile *Intereſt*, and by the other Party they are called *Influence*. Conſider, dear Sir, with yourſelf, how your Friends and Acquaintance act with reſpect to the People in general, and to their Electors in particular: Do they rely altogether on their known Characters for Wiſdom, Virtue, Diſintereſtedneſs, Loyalty, and Publick Spirit? or, do they not condeſcend to mix with theſe, Applications of a ſomewhat different Nature? Do they not addreſs themſelves to the Paſſions of ſome Men, to the Prejudices of others? Do they not conſtrain their own Humours,

Humours, and go out of their own Way, that by obliging Numbers they may become popular? I ſay nothing of Arts of another Nature, ſuch as giving Hopes of extraordinary Munificence to a decayed Corporation, making uſe of the neceſſary Dependance of Tenants, and exerting the united Force of family Engagements. Add to all this, the Intrigues and Cabals of a Faction thoroughly formed, or as the *all-accompliſhed Viſcount* phraſes it, a well-conducted Oppoſition; and I conceive you will have a pretty juſt Idea of the Nature and Weight of what is called the *Country Intereſt*.

If, therefore one ſhould incline to allow what the Speakers and Scribes of your Party ſo violently contend for, that an Oppoſition is everlaſtingly neceſſary to preſerve our Liberties; you, on the other Hand, muſt allow, that the Government muſt ſubſiſt; for otherwiſe, I think our Liberties would be hardly worth preſerving. If you will admit this, you muſt allow them the Means of ſubſiſting; and theſe are no other, than ſuch an Intereſt among the People as may, in ſome Meaſure, balance the Power of a continual Oppoſition; but you will immediately cry out, this is pleading for bare-faced Corruption: No, Sir, it is pleading for the Conſequences of the Revolution, which have re-

reduced

duced the Crown, inſtead of depending on it's high Prerogatives, to ſtoop ſo low as to depend upon the People: That is to ſay, to depend on their Kindneſs, Affection, and Good-will; whence the Neceſſity ariſes of giving Places to ſuch as have large Properties; and give me leave to ſay, Sir, that this is the ſtrongeſt Security, which in the Nature of Things the People can have, for the perpetual Preſervation of their Freedom. While the Crown cannot be without Parliaments, the Adminiſtration, in whatever Hands it is, muſt have a ſtrong Dependance upon the Commons, and muſt cultivate a good Underſtanding with them, by the beſt Methods they can deviſe, and the moſt ſuitable to the Nature of our Conſtitution, and the Circumſtances of the Times. They muſt cheriſh Principles of Liberty, they muſt maintain the People in the Poſſeſſion of it, they muſt have a due Regard to the Trade of the Nation at home, and to it's political Intereſts abroad. In fine, they muſt do their Duty in a great Meaſure; for otherwiſe the Paſſions of a free People are not to be reſtrained. Great Misfortunes, real Poverty, manifeſt Oppreſſions, are Things that the *Britiſh* People will not endure, they are apt to fire at the very Sound of them; but I believe, they are ſeldom apt to ſtir, or to ha-

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zard the great Goods that they poſſeſs, till they feel the Evils complained of. Whatever Ways, whatever Arts, whatever Means, ſuch as are in the Adminiſtration, and their Friends uſe, to maintain this Intereſt in the Commons, and thereby to keep the Government in a ſteady, ſettled Courſe, the Sum of them is what you and your Friends affect to call Miniſterial Influence; though in fact, it is Miniſterial Dependance, the Chain by which they are bound to the People.

I make no Manner of doubt that you are ready to ſuggeſt a Multitude of warm, ſprightly things againſt what I have advanced. But Wit ought to be out of the Queſtion here: In Matters of this Importance we muſt not truſt to the Livelineſs of the Imagination, but to Solidity of Judgment. I have repreſented things to you as they truly are; you may view them in a fairer Light if you will, by conſidering them as they ſhould be. But thoſe who are to deal with Mankind, muſt deal with them as they find them, and not according to their ſpeculative Reflections on human Nature. This all Parties will do, whether they are diſtinguiſhed by the Name of Court or Country, Patriots or Place-men. What is there, dear Sir, that has given your Friends greater Offence, than the keeping up regular Forces; and yet do you not well

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remember the Time, when they attempted to bring over the Army, and would have made every Field-Officer a Freeholder in his Commiſſion? What was it, not long ago, that brought over the Patrons of the Schiſm-Bill to ſuch a compaſſionate Senſe of the preſent Circumſtances of the *Diſſenters?* Will you ſay ſeriouſly that theſe hot, high-flying Gentlemen, are become better Chriſtians, and entertain juſter Notions of Peace and Charity than formerly they did? I know, Sir, you are too wiſe and too honeſt to pretend this. But why, in the Name of Wonder, will you entertain a more favourable Opinion of the Civil than of the Church-Scheme, of theſe new-fangled Politicians? Why ſhould you believe their Hate to Placemen better grounded than their Love to the *Diſſenters*, or their Reſpect to the Army? Believe me, Sir, they are all alike, all Refinements of factious Policy, which, under the Veil of publick Spirit, aims at engroſſing the Management of publick Affairs. I am thoroughly ſatisfied that, whenever your Paſſion cools a little, and the Edge of your Prejudice is taken off, you will diſcern the Truth of what I ſay, and either give up the Proſecution of this ſanguine Scheme, or openly carry it on as a thing neceſſary for the Service of your Party, and without obtaining of

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which they can never hope, even after ſo long and fierce a Struggle, to diſlodge the preſent Miniſtry, and come themſelves into Power. Such a Conduct, as it would be more candid, ſo I do not think it would be leſs cunning, than that which is now purſued; ſince it is certain, that Numbers begin to open their Eyes, and to exerciſe the Privilege of *Common Senſe* at the Expence of the *Craftſmen.*

Farewel, Sir, I have done for ever with this Diſpute; your Mirmidons may treat me as they think fit, they may dreſs me in black or in red, put on a band of this kind or of that, call me Scribbler, Sycophant, Mercenary, while they themſelves much better deſerve thoſe Apellations. I ſhall reſt ſatisfied that I have drawn the Curtain from before this *Raree-Shew*, and ſhewn the Faction's beloved *Scheme* in it's *true Light.* It was due to Truth, to Juſtice, to the People; they have been long enough made the Tools of a ſelf-intereſted Party, who mean Places while they rail at them, and who covet Power, though they would be thought to deſpiſe it. The Nation at this critical Conjuncture hath other Things to mind than their Chimerical Projects; we are perhaps within a few Months of appearing in a more glorious

Light than any other People in *Europe*; and I hope, we ſhall have more Wiſdom than to neglect the Opportunity of fixing our Power and Reputation for ever, for the Sake of gratifying the longing Deſires of a few Men amongſt us, who cannot be quiet while in a *private Condition*, nor would let us be long ſo, if they were in *publick Stations*. Pardon this ſecond printed Addreſs, becauſe it was neceſſary; and do not, on account of my writing freely, deny me the Honour of ſubſcribing my ſelf

Your affectionate Friend,

and obedient humble
Servant,